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Communicating over adversarial quantum channels
using quantum list codes
Debbie Leung and Graeme Smith
Abstract— We study quantum communication in the presence
of adversarial noise. In this setting, communicating with perfect
fidelity requires a quantum code of bounded minimum distance,
for which the best known rates are given by the quantum
Gilbert-Varshamov (QGV) bound. Asking only for arbitrarily
high fidelity and letting the sender and reciever use a secret
key of length logarithmic in the number of qubits sent, we find a
dramatic improvement over the QGV rates. In fact, our protocols
allow high fidelity transmission at noise levels for which perfect
fidelity is impossible. To achieve such rates, we introduce fully
quantum list codes, which may be of independent interest.
Index Terms— Quantum error correction, adversarial chan-
nels, approximate quantum codes, quantum list codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effectively dealing with noise is a major challenge faced
by all proposals for the coherent manipulation of quantum
information. Besides communication, sending a quantum state
over a noisy channel models noisy storage, and as such,
characterizing communication rates for quantum channels is
a central question in the study of both quantum information
and computation.
Various asymptotic capacities of quantum channels have been
studied [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
However, this work has been almost exclusively concerned
with discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), wherein a sender
and receiver use many independent and identical copies of a
channel. In this scenario, one studies the asymptotic commu-
nication rate possible using an operation of the form N⊗n,
where N is the channel under consideration and the rate is
R = k/n where k is the number of high fidelity logical qubits
sent. Relatively little is known outside of the DMC scenario,
with notable exceptions found in [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
In this paper, we study an adversarial quantum channel (AQC),
which is perhaps as different from a DMC as one can imagine.
When sending n qubits over an AQC, instead of errors on dif-
ferent qubits occuring independently, an adversary who knows
what protocol is being used tries to foil the communication by
maliciously choosing a superposition of errors, subject only to
a restriction on the number of qubits each error affects. We
call this channel N advp,n , where p is the fraction of qubits the
adversary is allowed to corrupt. N advp,n is the natural quantum
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generalization of the classical adversarial channel that was
considered in [17], [18] and whose roots go back to [19].
If the receiver must reconstruct the logical state exactly,
communicating over N advp,n requires a quantum error correcting
code (QECC) of distance 2⌈np⌉ + 1. The quantum Gilbert-
Varshamov bound guarantees the existence of such a code with
a rate of at least 1−H(2p)−2p log 3 [20], where logarithms are
taken base 2 here and throughout. Communication beyond this
rate is possible only if QECCs beating the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound exist, which is a question that has been quite difficult
to resolve. Furthermore, Rains has shown [21], [22] that no
quantum code can have distance greater than n
(
3−√3) /4 ≈
0.317n, so that it is impossible to send even a single qubit for
p ≥ (3−√3)/8 ≈ 0.158.
However, if we ask only for a high fidelity reconstruction,
and allow the sender and receiver to share a secret key of
size O(log n) it is possible to communicate at rates much
higher than the Gilbert-Varshamov and Rains bounds suggest.
Below, we present a coding strategy for this scenario with a
rate of 1−H(p)−p log 3, which is significantly larger than the
Gilbert-Varshamov rate for all values of p and remains nonzero
up to p ≈ 0.189. Our rate equals the best communication rate
via the depolarizing channel (in the DMCs scenario) of error
probability p using only nondegenerate codes.
There are three ingredients in achieving such rates with
negligible length secret keys. The first is a predetermined
quantum list code that is known to the adversary. This alone
allows high-rate but low-fidelity transmission. To improve the
fidelity, a random subcode is further chosen according to a
secret key unknown to the adversary. Finally, the subcode is
derandomized using small-biased sets.
Before explaining the construction of our code, we first discuss
some intuition on why the code works and how resources are
being reduced. Informally, a quantum list code is an error
correcting code with the relaxed reconstruction requirement
that the decoded state be equal to the original state acted
on by a superposition of a small number of errors. We
call the number of errors the “list length.” This relaxation
allows a considerable increase in rate over QECCs, and by
a random coding argument we show there are list codes with
constant-length lists and rates approaching 1−H(p)−p log 3
that tolerate pn errors. To distinguish between the errors in
the list and communicate with high fidelity, the sender and
receiver select a large subcode of the list code using a secret
key. In particular, this can be chosen pseudorandomly by using
O(log n) bits of secret key.
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We can interpret our code as a set of (parity) check conditions
that yield syndrome information. Most of these conditions are
used in list-decoding and can be known to the adversary,
and the rest of the conditions are pseudorandom and with
high probability are capable of completely distinguishing the
errors on the list. Note that there are simpler constructions
using randomness unknown to the adversary, and we now
make a comparison. The first construction is simply a random
(nondegenerate) quantum error correcting code achieving the
same rate but requiring O(n2) bits of secret key 1. Second,
one could use a secret permutation of the n qubits in the AQC
turning the adversarial channel to something very similar to
n depolarizing DMCs of error p in the DMCs setting [24],
[15]. The best known rate is similar to ours (but slightly
better for large p) but the cost will be O(n logn) bits of key,
which, unfortunately, still gives a divergent key rate. Third,
the standard derandomizing technique of key recycling cannot
be used in a straightforward way in the current, adversarial,
context. Thus, our hybrid construction involving a known list-
code and a pseudorandom subcode demonstrates what type
of randomness is unnecessary, and can be seen as a method
to derandomize other key-inefficient protocols, achieving the
same task with a much shorter key.
For the rest of the paper, we summarize related works, review
background material, present the details of our construction,
after which we discuss various applications and open prob-
lems.
Related work
Approximate error correction was studied in [25] to reduce
the block length (and thus improving the rate) for a more
specific error model. Success criterion and algebraic sufficient
conditions were given. Reference [26] provided an infor-
mation theoretic approximate error correction criterion. The
approximation in these works stems from a relaxed decoding
procedure. Much closer to our work is Ref. [27] (in the
context of quantum secret sharing) that used a randomized
code to maximize the distance with high probability but the
rate is low (of lesser concern in that context). Our construction
was inspired by that in [17] in the classical setting. Further
comparisons between our work and these earlier results and
insights obtained will be discussed in Section V.
After the initial presentation of this result [28], we learned
of two independent studies of list codes, both in settings quite
different from our own. Ref. [29] studied decoding of classical
list codes with quantum algorithms, and Ref. [30] studied list
codes for sending classical messages via iid quantum channels.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
Our sender, receiver, and adversary will be named Alice, Bob,
and Eve, respectively. The encoding of a k-qubit state |ψ〉
into a QECC will be written as |ψ¯〉. We call the Pauli group
acting on n qubits Gn and write its elements in the form
P = itXuZv, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u,v are binary vectors
1It is folklore, somewhat implicit in the hashing protocol of [23]. It is also
implied by our current construction.
of length n, Xu (Zv) denotes Xu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xun(Zv1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
Zvn), X = (0 11 0) and Z = (1 00 −1). The (anti)commutation
relation between P1, P2 ∈ Gn is determined by P1P2 =
(−1)ω(P1,P2)P2P1 with ω(P1, P2) = u1 · v2 + u2 · v1, where
the dot products and sum are computed in arithmetic modulo
two. We let 〈Pl〉 denote the subgroup of Gn generated by a
set of Pauli elements {Pl}.
A state |ψ〉 is said to be stabilized by a Pauli matrix P when
P |ψ〉 = |ψ〉. An [n, k] stabilizer code is a 2k-dimensional
space of n-qubit states simultaneously stabilized by all ele-
ments of a size 2n−k abelian subgroup of Gn. The abelian
subgroup is typically called S and is referred to as the code’s
stabilizer, and has n−k generators denoted by {Si}n−ki=1 . For
any E ∈ Gn we refer to the (n−k)-bit string ω(E, Si) as
the syndrome of E [20], [31]. The weight of a Pauli matrix
P , which we denote by wt(P ), is the number of qubits on
which P acts nontrivially, and we call a stabilizer code an
[n, k, d] code if it can detect all errors outside of S of weight
less than the distance d, which is equivalent to being able
to correct all errors of weight less than ⌊(d−1)/2⌋. For any
positive real number r, let Er be the set of Pauli matrices of
weight no more than ⌊r⌋. Let N(S) be the set of all unitaries
leaving S invariant under conjugation. (N(S) is the center
and also the normalizer of S in Gn, thus the symbol N .)
Note that two errors Ei and Ej have the same syndrome if
and only if E†iEj ∈ N(S). Thus S defines an [n, k, d] code
exactly when every pair of errors Ei, Ej ∈ E(d−1)/2 satisfies
E†iEj 6∈ N(S)−S. Intuitively, it means that the syndrome can
be used to identify all errors of concern up to a multiplicative
factor that is in S and has no effect on the codespace.
We state a property of the Pauli group that will be useful later.
For any subgroup G of Gn, for any set S of i independent ele-
ments in G, and a specific (ordered) list of i (anti)commutation
relations with elements of S, exactly |G|/2−i elements of G
will satisfy those relations.
Definition 1 The n-qubit adversarial quantum channel with
error rate p, which we call N advp,n , acts on a state of n qubits,
ρ, and is of the form
N advp,n (ρ) =
∑
i
AiρA
†
i with Ai =
∑
E∈Epn
αiEE (1)
subject to the requirement that ∑iA†iAi = I and where
Enp = {E ∈Gn |wt(E)≤ pn} is as defined before. The
particular choice of the {Ai}’s is made by Eve only after
Alice and Bob have decided on a communication strategy.
Notice that to communicate effectively over N advp,n one must
find a strategy that works with high fidelity for all channels
described by Eq. (1). To do this, we will use quantum list
codes, which are defined below.
Definition 2 We say that an [n, k] stabilizer code, C, is an
[n, k, t, L]-list code if there is a decoding operation, D, such
that for every Ei ∈ Et and |ψ¯〉 ∈ C, the decoded k-qubit state,
along with the syndrome s, is given by D(Ei|ψ¯〉〈ψ¯|E†i ) =∑
s
∑
j A
s
j |ψ〉〈ψ|As†j ⊗|s〉〈s| where
∑
sj A
s†
j A
s
j = I , and each
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Asj is a linear combination of the 2L elements of 〈P sl 〉Ll=1,
where {P sl }Ll=1 is a list of logical errors on the codespace
and 〈P sl 〉Ll=1 is the group they generate.
Note that in the above definition, the set {P sl }Ll=1 generating
the error list depends on the syndrome s.
III. QUANTUM LIST CODES
We now show that, asymptotically, there exist [n, k, t, L]-list
codes with favorable parameters. We proceed by considering
random stabilizer codes, arguing along the lines of [23], [20].
In particular, we will show that if we choose a random
stabilizer code with rate as below, in the limit of large n the
probability of it failing to be L-list decodable is less than 1.
Theorem 3 [n, ⌊Rn⌋, ⌊pn⌋, L]-list codes exist for sufficiently
large n and for
R < 1−
(
1 +
1
L
)
(H(p) + p log 3) . (2)
Proof: Let NE = |Epn| and Epn = {Ei}NEi=1. Since two
errors Ei and Ej have the same syndrome iff E†iEj ∈ N(S),
a code will fail to be L-list decodable only if there are L+ 1
independent errors E0, · · · , EL outside of S having the same
syndrome. Mathematically, this means E†iEj ∈ N(S) for 0 ≤
i, j ≤ L (or equivalently, E†0Ej ∈ N(S) for 1 ≤ j ≤ L). The
proof consists of two steps: (1) bounding the probability (over
the code) for a fixed list of L independent Pauli matrices to be
in N(S), and (2) taking the union bound over all such possible
lists to show that list-decoding will fail with probability (over
the code) strictly less than 1. Thus, the desired list code must
exist.
Step (1) is essentially a counting argument. How many ways
can we choose n−k stabilizer generators S1, S2, · · ·Sn−k?
Here we omit overall factors of ±1, i, but we count different
generating sets (for the same code) and different orderings.2
There are two constraints for the generating set, commu-
tivity and independence. S1 can be chosen from any of
the 22n−1 nontrivial Pauli matrices. Recall the property of
Gn stated in the previous section. S2 can be chosen from
the 22n−1 Pauli matrices commuting with S1 but must be
chosen from outside of the multiplicative group generated by
S1, thus there are 22n−1 − 2 choices. Similarly, each Si is
chosen from the 22n−(i−1) Pauli matrices commuting with
S1, · · · , Si−1 but not from the multiplicative group generated
by them, so there are 22n−(i−1) − 2i−1 choices. Thus, there
are Πn−k−1a=0
(
22n−a−2a) distinct generating sets.
Now, for an arbitrary and fixed list E0, · · · , EL of independent
errors, how many choices of stabilizer generators will give a
code with {E†0Ej} ∈ N(S) ∀j=1, · · · , L? This counting is
similar to the above, but now S1, S2 · · ·Sn−k are constrained
2Our analysis revolves around random stabilizer generators rather than
random codes. As an aside, the resulting code is also randomly distributed.
Also, any stabilizer of size 2n−k has
Q
n−k−1
b=0
`
2
n−k−b
−1
´
different
generating sets, so we have also found the total number of stabilizers codes
of this size.
to commute with {E†0Ej}, in addition to the two original
constraints. In other words, S1 can be chosen from the
22n−L − 1 nontrivial Pauli operators commuting with the
E†0Ej , and S2 has 22n−L+1−2 choices, and so on. Thus, there
are Πn−k−1a=0
(
22n−L−a−2a) sets of stabilizer generators that
commute with all of E†0Ej .
Putting together with the two stabilizer counts, one un-
constrained and the other with the same syndrome for
{Ej}j=0,··· ,L, the latter has probability
Πn−k−1a=0
(
22n−L−a−2a)
Πn−k−1a=0 (2
2n−a−2a) ≤ 2
−L(n−k). (3)
For step (2), we apply the union bound for the choice
of the L+1 Ej ’s. The probability that a random [n, k]
code is not L-list decodable is less than
(
NE
L+1
)
2−L(n−k),
which is no more than NL+1E 2−L(n−k). The latter is less
than 1 if k < n−(1+ 1L ) logNE . But NE = |Epn| =∑⌊np⌋
r=0 3
r
(
n
r
)
. For any δ > 0, ∃nδ s.t. whenever n ≥
nδ, logNE ≤ n(H(p)+p log 3+δ/3) so choosing k =
n
[
1− (1+ 1L) (H(p)+p log 3)−2δ/3] finishes the proof.
IV. CODING STRATEGY
Theorem 3 tells us that for any R < 1−H(p)−p log 3, there
exist [n,Rn, pn, L]-list codes for large enough n and L. For
example, we can choose the various parameters as δ = 1 −
H(p) − p log 3 − R, L ≥ 3δ (H(p)+ log 3), and n ≥ nδ in
Thm. 3). Note that L does not grow with n.
We now fix such a list-code, Cn,L. This always returns a
syndrome s, a corresponding list of errors Qsf ∈ 〈P sl 〉,
and a list-decoded state of the form
∑
iB
s
i |ψ〉〈ψ|Bsi † =:
N s(|ψ〉〈ψ|), where |ψ〉 is the sender’s intended logical state,∑
iB
s
i
†Bsi = I , and each Bsi is in the span of Qsf . Note that
list-decoding removes all superposition between errors with
different syndromes. Also, no approximation has been made
so far.
Now we add a few more stabilizer generators to Cn,L so that
with high probability (over the choice of the extra generators)
the receiver can decode |ψ〉 unambiguously. These generators
are determined by a secret key shared by the sender and
receiver, making them unknown to the adversary.
It will follow from the proof of Thm. 4 below that adding
(1/ log(4/3))(2L + log(1/ǫ)) random generators to the code
Cn,L would allow us to distinguish among the {Qsf}2
L
j=1
possible errors, with probability at least 1−ǫ. This would
require 2n(2L+log(1/ǫ))/ log(4/3) bits of shared key.
A much smaller key can be used if small-biased sets are
used to choose these extra stabilizers pseudorandomly [32],
[33]. A subset of {0, 1}m, denoted A, is said to be an η-
biased set of length m if for each e ∈ {0, 1}m, roughly
half of the elements of A have odd/even parity with e, or
mathematically, |Pra∈A (e · a = 0)− Pra∈A (e · a = 1)| ≤ η.
There are efficient constructions of η-biased sets of length m
with only O(m
2
η ) elements [32], [33].
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Let G0 be the set of stabilizer generators of Cn,L. We add
K extra stabilizer generators T1, · · · , TK . When j of these
have been added, denote the code by Cn,Lj , with k−j encoded
qubits and generator set Gj . (Each Cn,Lj is a subcode of Cn,Lj−1.)
The next generator Tj+1 has to commute with all of Gj but
not be generated by it, thus, it is an encoded operation on
the code Cn,Lj . Without loss of generality, it is an encoded
Pauli operation on the encoded k−j qubits, and can be chosen
according to a random element of an η-biased set Aj+1 of
length 2(k−j). The following theorem shows that using this
procedure to add K = O(L log 1/ǫ) stabilizers allows the
receiver to reconstruct the encoded state with high probability.
Using the efficient constructions of η-biased sets of length
m ≤ 2n with only O(n2η ) elements, our construction requires
O
(
(2L+ log(1/ǫ)) log(n2/η)
)
bits of key.
Theorem 4 Let Cn,L be an [n,Rn, pn, L]-list code of rate R
and let Cn,LK be the code obtained from Cn,L by progressively
adding K = (1/ log(4/3))(2L + log(1/ǫ)) stabilizers deter-
mined by η-biased sets A1, · · · , AK (of decreasing length)
as described above. By using a secret key of fewer than
O(K(log(n
2
η ))) bits to select Cn,LK , nR −K = n(R − o(n))
qubits can be sent over N advp,n with fidelity at least 1 − ǫ for
all ǫ < 1/2.
Proof: The [n,Rn, pn, L]-list code reduces the adver-
sary’s power to choosing some N s (with operation elements
in the span of {Qsf}2
L
f=1 = 〈P sl 〉) and a distribution of s.
So, if we prove that for each s, the probability (over the
choice of T1, · · · , TK) is less than ǫ to fail to distinguish
between the {Qsf}2
L
f=1, the fidelity of the decoded state with
the original will be at least 1 − ǫ. More specifically, fix an
arbitrary s. It is shown in [34] that N s has a χ-representation
N s(ρ) =∑f,f ′ χf,f ′Qsfρ(Qsf ′)† and let
Fs = {k|∃f,f ′ ω(T kl , Qsf) = ω(T kl , Qsf ′)} (4)
be the set of key values for which the additional stabilizer
generators fail to determine the list element. Then, letting
|ψk〉〈ψk| be the encoded logical state and Dsk be the decoding
operation given list s and key k, our decoded state is
1
K
K∑
k=1
Dsk(N s(|ψk〉〈ψk|))
=
1
K
∑
k 6∈Fs
Dsk(N s(|ψk〉〈ψk|)) +
1
K
∑
k∈Fs
Dsk(N s(|ψk〉〈ψk|))
= (1− Pr(Fs))|ψ〉〈ψ| + Pr(Fs)φs, (5)
where φs = 1K Pr(Fs)
∑
k∈Fs
Dsk(N s(|ψk〉〈ψk|)) is the state
conditional on the key failing to distinguish the list elements
properly. We will now show that Pr(Fs) can be made less than
ǫ for all lists of length 2L by choosing K as in the theorem.
This results in a decoding fidelity of at least 1− ǫ.
Now fix f, f ′ and define the events Mj as {ω(Qsf , Tj) =
ω(Qsf ′ , Tj)}. Then, the probability, over the choices of
T1,··· ,K , that they assign the same syndrome to Qsf and Qsf ′
is Pr
(∩Kj=1Mj) = ∏Kj=1 Pr (Mj |Mj−1 . . .M1). Since each
Tj is chosen using an η-biased string of encoded operations
of the code Cn,Lj−1, we have Pr (Mj |Mj−1 . . .M1) ≤ 1+η2 ,
which immediately implies that Pr
(∩Kj=1Mj) ≤ ( 1+η2 )K . By
a union bound over the choice of f, f ′, the probability of any
pair having the same commutation relations for all j is less
than 22L
(
1+η
2
)K
.
By choosing η ≤ 1/2, K = (1/ log(4/3))(2L+ log(1/ǫ)) we
make this failure probability less than ǫ so that with probability
at least 1−ǫ, Qsf can be unambiguously identified and the state
reconstructed.
Note that ǫ can be made to vanish exponentially with n without
incurring extra n-dependence on the key size.
In Theorem 4, the extra generators can distinguish the worst
case N s and no union bound over s is needed. Furthermore,
the additional stabilizers do not depend on s. It means that
the final construction is a single quantum error correcting
code depending only on a small key. It also means that it is
not necessary to first perform list-decoding before selecting
the extra stabilizers. The combined decoding operation is
independent of s but concludes the error based on the joint
inputs of s and the extra syndrome bits (one possible way of
which is to first output a list based on s).
V. DISCUSSION
We have introduced the adversarial quantum channel and
shown that using a logarithmic length secret key one can com-
municate over this channel with a rate of 1−H(p)−p log 3.
This is far higher than would be naively expected from
existing QECCs, and quite close to the best known rates for
independent depolarizing channels of error probability p. Our
construction involves quantum list codes, which we defined
and showed to exist with favorable parameters. Classical list
decoding has recently played an important role in several
complexity theoretic results (for a review, see [35]), and we
expect quantum list codes will be similarly useful in the
context of quantum complexity theory.
The scenario considered in this paper and the spirit of our
protocols are closely related to those of [27]. Comparing their
result with ours points to interesting open questions. Reference
[27] constructed approximate quantum error correcting codes
of length n capable of correcting up to (n− 1)/2 errors with
high probability (compared to at most n/4 correctable errors
for an exact code). Thus, the fraction of errors that can be
tolerated in [27] approaches 1/2 as n gets large, which is much
higher than in our scheme. Furthermore, unlike our scheme,
no secret key is required. Instead, randomizing parameters are
sent as part of the message via carefully constructed secret
sharing schemes. However, the alphabet size of the codes in
[27] grows as a function of both the blocklength and the code’s
accuracy which severely limits the transmission rate. Also,
when their large dimensional channel is viewed as a block
of qubit channels, the adversary considered in [27] is much
more restricted than ours, being limited to the corruption of
contiguous blocks of qubits.
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Altogether, there is a general open question on the tradeoff
between distance, rate, and key required for a code. More
specifically, it is an interesting question whether there are
qubit approximate QECCs which achieve the rates of our
codes without using a secret key, or, less ambitiously, one
with constant size. We have also left unanswered the capacity
of N advp,n assisted by a negligible length secret key. It seems
plausible that the capacity is equal to that of the depolarizing
channel with error rate p, which would be in analogy with
the classical result of [17]. While the capacity of for the
depolarizing channel is an open question, one may find codes
for N advp,n with rates matching the best known for the depo-
larizing channel. It will also be interesting to consider other
side resources such as a negligible amount of entanglement.
Finally, unlike DMCs, it is unclear for adversarial channels
whether the capacity can be improved with a small number of
uses of noiseless quantum channels.
As a side remark, our scheme uses the secret key as a
randomizing parameter that is inaccessible to the adversary.
Since the adversary must corrupt the transmitted state before
it is received by Bob, if Bob is allowed to send a “receipt”
of the quantum states to Alice, she can simply disclose the
random code afterwards and no key is required. In other words,
one bit of back communication along with logarithmic forward
classical communication (all authenticated) can replace the key
requirement.
As another side remark, as the channel can be used to create
entanglement, the key used in the communication can be
replenished by sending a negligible number of EPR pairs
(without affecting the communication rate). Thus the key
requirement is only catalytic.
Our result also finds application to a related problem—
entanglement distillation with bounded weight errors. In this
problem, a state is already distributed between Alice and Bob,
so the adversary has already acted and randomizing parameters
can be sent in public without a receipt. In [36], it was shown
that n noisy EPR pairs with errors of weight up to pn could
be purified to n(1 −H(p) − p log 3) perfect EPR pairs by a
two-way distillation procedure. Our construction lets us distill
high fidelity EPR pairs at the same rate with only forward
classical communication. In fact, it was suggested in [36] that
quantum list codes could be used to reduce the computational
complexity of their protocols—almost exactly the approach
taken here, though in our case with an eye towards reducing
the communication required. The question of efficent encoding
and decoding via list codes has not yet been resolved.
It may also be interesting to consider how restricting the
computational power of our adversary affects the channel’s
capacity, which is another topic we leave to future work. The
investigation of other restrictions (such as causality of the
adversarial channel) is also natural in certain situations and
may lead to additional insights.
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